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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IRENE PAUL and CHARLES J.
PAUL,
Respondents,
vs.
vVOODROW LAWRENCE KIRKENDALL,
Appellant.

STATEMEN"T OF FACTS
Respondents disagree with the statement of facts
of the Appellant. In fact the Appellant's purported
statement of facts is so meager that it can hardly be
characterized as a statement, and the Respondents doubt
very much that it is sufficient to satisfy Rule 75{p) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In the course of
Appellant's argument he quotes or paraphrases extensively some of the testimony, particularly that portion
which was favorable to him as if upon the erroneous
theory that this court would consider the '"'"eight of the
evidence in an appeal of this kind, but that clearly
does not satisfy the rule.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In any event the Appellant's statement is so inadequate that we are constrained to restate the facts so
that the matter Inay be considered by the Court as it
should be considered.
In this statement we will use the letter "T" to refer
to the Transcript of Testimony and the letter "R" to
refer to the balance of the Record, which is separately
bound.
Respondents agree that this is a suit for damages
for personal injuries to Irene Paul resulting in general
and special damages, and for damages to her husband
Charles J. Paul for the loss of the services of his wife.
At the opening of the trial the Appellant admitted
his liability and admitted that both Respondents had
suffered damages. He contested only the nature and
extent of the damages. (T. 4-5). The issue of damages
was tried to a jury and submitted under instructions to
which neither party took any exception. The jury returned a general verdict in the sum of $20,000 for the
Respondents and judgment was entered thereon. (R.
008 .and 009). At the same time the jury answered
special interrogatories submitted by the Court assessing
Irene Paul's general damages in the su1n of $11,800 and
Charles J. Paul's damages in the sum of $5,000. The
special medical expenses were stated to be in the sum
of $3000 and the balance recoverable by the Respondents
for property damage was fixed in accordance with the
instruction of the Court (given on stipulation) at $200.
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The .:\ppellant filed a motion for new trial upon
the ground of '• excessive damages appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.''
There was added the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict, but this is now immaterial
as only the excessive damage issue is presented in Appellant's Brief. (R. 011).
The motion for new trial was considered and denied
by the trial court and this appeal followed.
At the trial the following facts were presented in
evidence:

The Respondents are husband and wife, having been
married in 1948. l\Irs. Paul is forty (40) years old. She
has two sons, one ten years old, by a former marriage,
and one two years and four months old at the date of
the trial in November, 1952. (T. 7). Both children are a
part of the household of the Respondents.
The accident in question happened in San Fernando,
California on April 29, 1951. In this accident Mrs. Paul
sustained injuries to the lumbo-sacral joint of her lower
spine which later forced her to submit to an operation for
the fusion of this joint. She also suffered injuries to
both of her ankles. She suffered tremendous pain, nervousness and anxiety and cont!nued to suffer even
through the trial~
Inas1nuch as the accident happened in California, it
was agreed by the parties (in accordance with law),
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although it apparently does not appear fron1 the record,
that the California law applies as to the substantive
rights of the parties while as to all matters of procedure the Utah Law applies. It was understood that
the Court be entitled to take judicial notice of the laws
of California as of the laws of Utah, and the Court in
instructing the jury based its instructions on the substantive law on the California Book of Approved Jury
Instructions.
For some months immediately prior to the accident
Mrs. Paul had been in very good health. Prior to the
accident she had been active, even athletic, and had
played golf, bowled and ridden horseback with her
husband, and owned her own horse. Previously she had
done all her own housework. Eight (8) weeks after the
birth of her second child on July 12, 1950, she had almost
completely recovered from the birth and had returned
to a normal manner of living. She made no complaints
about her body and was able to do her own housework.
She accompanied her husband on several fishing trips in
the mountains and was riding horseback and bowling.
( ~. 23, 293-294).
Although she had a history of sinusitis attributed
to allergy, had suffered recurrence of cystitis (an infection of the bladder) following childbirth or abdominal
operations, had submitted to a uterine suspension for the
purpose of enabling her to have children, had undergone an appendectomy, had suffered a number of mis-
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carriages and had because of these miscarriages submitted to an operation for the tying of her fallopian
tubes following the birth of her second child, and had
had chest or thoracic cag·e X-rays to check her lungs
when she had a cold a little more than a week prior to
rhe accident, those matters are obviously unrelated to
the injuries she sustained in the accident and had cleared
up before the accident.
Her second son, as indicated, was born on July 12,
1950. She had been in bed during eight months of her
pregnancy and on getting back on her feet after this
long confinement she had some trouble with backaches.
This trouble, however, lasted only eight to ten weeks,
at the most, after the birth of her son. It also caused
some swelling of her ankles. ( T. 67-68). This backache and swelling, however, did not interfere at all with
her normal activity and her housework. (T. 294). Prior
to the accident she drove an automobile and did substantially all of the family shopping. (T. 369). After
the accident she was unable to drive the car or to do
any shopping. ( T. 369, 271).
It must be observed that the type of backache
she had follo"\\ring the birth of her ehild was something
that is normal and to be expected and was an entirely
diffPrent kind of pain frorn the kind she had in her
back following thes operation. Before the date of the
accident she nev.:•r had a pain which was similar to the
one she felt immediately after the accident and there-
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after and until after the operation. (T. 12, 16, 26 and
68). She had never had any injury to her lower back
prior to the accident of April 29, 1951. (T. 26).
At the time of the accident Mr. Paul was driving
the automobile and she was riding between him and
her oldest son and carrying her younger son of\ her
lap. The car was struck on the right front portion by
the Appellant's car with such force that it was spun
clear around and faced almost in the opposite direction.
Mrs. Paul saw the approaching ear and braced herself
and held her younger child firmly in an effort to protect him. She was violently thrown around in the car
and ended up half on the front seat of the car and half
on the floor boards in a semi-reclining position. She
felt immediate pain in her lower back and in both ankles
and was apparently in terrific pain, of which she complained. When the police attempted to move one of
her ankles she screamed and was left until an ambulance
came with skilled attendants to move her. (T. 8 and
276). She was taken to the San Fernando Hospital by
ambulance. Her husband accompanied her there. Upon
her arrival she was writhing in pain and had broken out
in a cold sweat and was groaning and exclaiming about
the pain in her back and tried to reach her back with
her arms and was complaining about the pain in her
ankles and abdomen. As the family physician was not
available, she and her husband consented to being treated
by Dr. Frank Pederson who happened to be at the ho~
pital. (T. 279). He noted that she was in extreme pain
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in her lmn'r ~pme, lumbar area, and both ankles. (T.
78). He ordered a.sedative after which she quieted down
somewhat. (T. 280). Dr. Pederson arranged to have
~an ..S:-ray taken of :Mrs. Paul, Exhibit 5, to assist in his
diagnosis. Her husband stayed for about one hour and
a half and then left. Son1etime during that night Mrs.
Paul was unable to empty her bladder and it was necessary because of· the distention thereof to remove that
pressure by means of catheterization. , ( T. 79-80).
She was hospitalized for approximately two and
a half day~ for relief of pain and X-rays taken to rule
out possible fractures of the pelvis.
Dr. Pederson finding no fractures gave accepted
treatment for the condition he did find-salicylate,
narcosis, diathermy and rest. She was then definitely
suffering severe pain and also from shock resulting
from the pain and the mental shock of the accident
according to Dr. Pederson. (T. 81-82). She also had
marked swelling of both ankles which Dr. Pederson found
resulted from the tearing of the lateral deltoid ligaments
of both ankles. It was his opinion that Mrs. Paul was
definitely injured in the accident as far as her ankles
and spine are concerned and his opinion would not be
changed by history of ankle pain and swelling for several
years prior. (T. 88).
She was discharged two and a half days later
showing moderate in1provement. (T. 86 and 283). When
she left the hospital she was unable to move by herself

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and was taken from her bed to the curb in a wheelchair and then Mr. Paul lifted her into the car and
on arriving home put her to bed. (T. 282). She remained
entirely in bed for about a week except as her husband
took her to Dr. Pederson for treatment. After that
with help fron1 others she tried to move about the house
a little bit but was seated and resting as much as possible. She complained of pain every time she tried to
move or anyone tried to move her. For about four
weeks after she got out of bed she was unable to move
at all without help and then she improved slightly
and was able to move about a little bit on her own
feet. (T. 283-284). It was apparent frmn the way she
moved that she could not move normally. She was
obviously in pain. (T. 285). Du:r;ing the month of
June, 1951, she was still unable to move in a normal
way or to sit or stand any length of time in any one
position. She constantly complained of pain in her
back. ( T. 286). In the forepart of July, 1951, she
was sent with relatives who came to help her to a
cabin in Big Bear, California to rest. This was done on
the recommendation of her doctor. She stayed there
over three weeks. ( T. 286-287). On her return her
condition was not a bit improved. She was becoming
increasingly nervous and tense. The pain had not subsided. ( T. 287). In August, 1951, her condition was
increasingly worse. She gave constant evidence of PXtreme pain by her err a tic motion and by exclamations,
indicating that her back was hurting her. Thereafter
and until she saw Dr. Ho1ner Graham, an orthopedir
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surgeon, there \Yere some days when her complaints were
not so nurnerous, but for the most part she was increasingly worse. Her husband, Charles J. Paul ,never observed her to be free of pain at any time. ( T. 289). On
September 4, 1951, she returned to Dr. Pederson asking
additional help. He examined her and found the coccyx
Yery tender to n1otion ,the tenderness extending out into
the ligan1ents to the left, suggestive of tearing of the
ligaments. This is normally caused by trauma. Prior
to this Dr. Pederson had last seen her on May 7, 1951,
\Vhen she was ''beginning to limber up'' but still haJ
persistent severe pain over the lower left lumbar area
and a persistent swelling of both ankles which were
· still painful. On her return to Dr. Pederson on September 4, 1951, he found Mrs. Paul was also still suffering
pain in the left lO\':er lumbar area, (T. 89), and she constantly complained of a sore lumbar spine. (T. 90).
Dr. Pederson prescribed corrective shoes for poor arches,
weak ankles and scoliosis (or sideways bending) in her
spine, thinking it would ease her pain. ( T. 52). As of that
time Dr. Pederson testified that her back was a puzzle
to him, but added, ''we do know that she must have had
severe back injuries o,r a blow to have temporary paralysis of her bladder," as he had found the night of the
accident. (T. 101-102).
From the first she followed Dr. Peterson's directions for treatment as much as possible. (T. 17). She
tried to wear the corrective shoes that Dr. Pederson
prescribed, but they caused her excruciating pain to
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such an extent that on one occasion she passed out on
the kitchen floor. She had never been known to faint
before. (T. 52 and 370).
Early in May she developed pain on urinating and
was referred by her family physician to Dr. Winfield
S. Herman, a urologist. He found she was suffering from
cystitis and treated her for that. (T. 13-14, 164-165). Dr.
Herman was of the opinion that it was a definite connection between the accident resulting in the distentim1
and catheterization and eystitis, because distention
lessens resistance and catheterization occasionally introduces infection no matter how much care is used. (T.
168B). He was also of the opinion that there was no
showing of a chronic . cystitis existing at the time of the
accident. (T. 179).
Mrs. Paul's past urinary infections have alway~
followed an operation or serious illness in which she wa~
catheterized. (T. 184). Dr. Herman's examinations wen'
very painful. As Appellant's counsel indicated in his
questioning. they are about as painful an examination
as any woman can undergo. ( T. 185). Mrs. Paul's
regular physician, Dr. Willard Crosley, had attende\l
her during her pregnancy, seeing her first for that cause
on February 28, 1950. He saw her periodically until ~11,•
was delivered of her child and noted that none of her
complaints included any pain in her lower back. (T.
192-193). He testified that the backaches she had in thl'
course of her pregnancy and following were of the usual
or normal type attending childbirth. (T. 210).
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As the conservative teabnent she had been given
did not help her, ~Irs. Paul consulted her family physician, Dr. Crosley, and was by him referred to Dr. Homer
Grahan1, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Graham is an orthopedic specialist with a good reputation and record. (T.
196). He examined her on Octiber 4, 1951 and obtained
a history. His physical examination disclosed localized
low back pain at the level of the lumbo-sacral joint. There
was muscle spasm of the entire lumbo-sacral mass of
muscles on either side. (T 116). He had X-rays of her
back taken on October 16, 1951. (T. 218, Exhibit 7).
He kept her under observation for more than a month
and presecribed a brace which she wore while she was
under observation. (T. 373-374). He consulted Dr.
Joseph C. Risser, an orthopedic surgeon nationally
known as a back specialist, (T. 220), and also Dr. Davi.d
Eder, a neurosurgeon of Pasadena for consideration
of a possibility of a ruptured disk or cord tumor or any
other neurosurgical condition. (T. 220, 223). Dr Ri~
ser reported that "the X-rays show, I feel, a fracture of
the facet of the left side'' and Dr. Eder found no evidence of a herniated disk. (T. 222-223).
Finally as Mrs. Paul was not responding to conservative treatment but was gro-vving worse, and more
nervous, apprehensi~.,e, anxious and tense, (T. 18 and
271), Dr. Graham concluded that a spinal fusion of the
lumbo-sacral point was necessary. He concluded that,
even though there might be no fracture, injury to the
joint required operation because the capsule in which
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the point was sheathed (which is generously supplied
with sensory nerves) and the cartilage could have suffered extensive damage and this does not repair normally. The replacing cartilage ordinarily does not wear well.
This, with muscle spasm, which results in poor circulation, causes the joint to deteriorate instead of improve. It
digests itself. This is especially true with a nervous
person of Mrs. Paul's type. (T. 288-229). Dr. Graham
concluded that Mrs. Paul had sustained damage to the
cartilage, the capsule and the ligaments about the lumbosactal joint requiring the fusion operation. (T. 269).
Finally on November 7, 1951, he performed this operation on Mrs. Paul because he had concluded that she had
an injured lumbo-sacral joint which refused to respond
to conservative treatment, and for the purpose of relieving her persistent pain. It is a common procedure to
fuse a joint which causes severe and persistent pain
in order to prevent further deterioration of the injured
joint. (T. 228-229). Dr. Graham testified that it was his
opinion that the injury for which he operated was caused
by the accident and that the operation was necessary.
(T. 232, 234).
Mrs. Paul was absent from her hospital room for
the purpose of the operation for some five hours. (T.
291).
This operation is a very major operation which is
attended with considerable pain and suffering. (T. 103).
Although Mrs. Paul frankly admitted that she
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was a nervous person and Dr. Pederson indicated he
thought she had some psychosomatic overlay, Dr. Graham stated that in Mrs. Paul's case he did not think
that the psycho-somatic overl¥y had any tendency to
bring about an exag·geration of her symptoms. (T. 250).
Moreover, he concluded that there was no malingering in
this case, as counsel for the Appellant agreed. (T. 250).
Dr. Graham testified that in' such operation he expects improvement for a period of one or two years but
not after that. ( T. 234).
Although 1\Irs. Paul's husband had never known
her to show such symptoms before, after the a;ccident
on April 29th and continually until the operation he
was awakened quite often at night by her crying and
by her grinding her teeth in her sleep. She was often
awakened in a cold sweat from the pain and he would
have to help her change her nightclothes. Except for a
period of time in mid-summer she was unable to get
aoout without assistance and when she visted Dr. Jones,
the physician who examined her in behalf of the Appel~
lant on October 5, 1951, she was unable to walk without
aid and he had to assist her. ( T. 366, 368, 372 and 379).
During almost all of the time between the accident and
the operation she was in extreme pain with night sweats,
moaning and groaning and waking up nights. (T. 376).
During this period of time there were many involuntary
exclamations of pain such as rnoaning, groaning and
nashing of teeth and quite often when she would step
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on an irregular place on a sidewalk or at the edge of the
carpet she would exclaim involuntarily and show pain.
( T. 372). During this time her husband had to assist
her in getting in and out of bed. Usually when the pain
wakened her at night and she would try to get up and
walk she could not get in or out of bed without help.
(T. 370).
After the operation she was fifteen days in the
hospital, then she returned home where she stayed
in bed for better than four weeks. After she got up
there was a period of convalescence when she was unable
to do any of her duties. This continued until March 15,
1952, when she resumed some of her household tasks.
Since then her condition has improved rather rapidly.
She still (at the time of the trial) had made some complaints but of a different degree. (T. 291 to 293).
Dr. Charles M. Swindler of Ogden who examined
:Jfrs. Paul for the Appellant during the course of the
trial noted that even then on November 19, 1952, more
than a year after the accident her gait was still "somewhat guarded and protected." (T. 302). Dr. Swindler
conceded that on the basis of the evidence furnished him
he could not decide whether or not the fusion was
necessary. (T. 339). Dr. George W. Jones, the other
expert who examined Mrs. Paul for the Appellant, likewise refused to testify that the operation was not necessary. ( T. 405). Apparently he recognized that only the
physician in charge with all of the then circumstances
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m mind could Inake a valid decision. (T. 339). Dr.
Swindler also conceded that a fusion operation is properly done to eliminate pain and that if in the accident
).frs. Paul had incurred an acute spinal flexion or bending, a fracture of the fa,cet would be likely and that there
would have been an injury to the joint whether she had
a fracture or not. (T. 355).
Dr. Louis S. Peery, an orthopedic surgeon of
Ogden, Utah, and a man of very high standing in his
field, testified for the plaintiffs. (T. 117). He had
examined the x-ray Exhibit 5 which was taken on the
night of the accident, and additional x-rays were take11
at the time of the trial under his direction. (Exhibits 11
and 12 and T. 119-120). It was his considered opinion
that the x-ray Exhibit 5 discloses a possible fracture at
the edge of the facets in the lumbar area, and that the
possible fratcure line shown in Exhibit 5 is not suggestive
of a congenital anomaly because the line too ragged, and
because the x-ray taken on October 16, 1951, just before
the operation, shows a relatively less distinct line than
the one taken immediately after the accident, indicating
a healing of a fracture rather than a congenital anomaly.
(T. 120, 129, 134-135).
Dr. Peery further testified that the x-rays exhibits
11 and 12 show a bone graft across the lumbo-'sacral
joint, further secured by two screws, which eliminates
the joint and the motion in that area. They show a filling in of the bone from the sacrum to the 5th lumbar
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vertebrae and disclose an excellent fusion-a very successfull operation. (T. 120-121).
Dr. Peery also testified that the purpose of the
fusion operation for the most part is to eliminate pain
in the joint, as distinguished from correcting a fracture,
and that the pain could come from traun1a to the joint
even though there was no fracture. He conilllented that
more fusions are done to eliminate pain than because of
a fracture. (T. 121, 156).
Dr. Peery also testified that he has reviewed the
history of the case as it existed in October of 1951 immediately prior to the operation and that under the
circumstances then existing he would consider that "His
hand w:ould be forced to do more than had been done up
to that time. In other words, she had been given adequate
conservative treatment, and it just didn't leave anything
left to do in the way of conservaive treatment that would
give her relief.'' ( T. 127). The scoliosis shown in he
x-ray films indicates muscle spasm. Dr. Peery was of
the opinion that at that stage the only alternatives ·were
to do a fusion operation to remove the pain in the lumbosacral joint or take the pain, which, as the other eviednce
indicates, had become unbearable. (T. 128).
Dr. Peery also testified that in the case of a fractured bone the pain comes from the irrigation to the
bone covering which is painful when stretched or torn,
and commented that a sprain of the sacroiliac can be
more severe than a fracture in the joint. (T. 133).
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~1 rs.

Paul was required to wear her back brace after
the operation and continued to do so until March of 1952,
when she was advised to leave it off ''whenever she
could.'' This she has been doing, and at the time of the
trial was able son1etimes to leave it off for as much as
four or five hours, but not more. She was still having
discomfort at each change of weather. (T. 374).
In this connection we believe it is proper to note
that during an extended trial the jury had great opportunity to observe Mrs. Paul's demeanor and gait and
to see her move about the courtroom and ascend and
descend the witness chair. It is believed that these personal observations which the jury very properly made
undoubtedly indicated to the jury that Mrs. Paul was
still suffering pain and great disability. In this connection Dr. Graham testified that Mrs. Paul may not be
completely and forever free from her pain although he
did believe she would ultimately be rehabilitated to the
point where her disabilit~r would not be ''significant.''
(T. 234). That desirable goal has not yet been reached.
About ten days before the trial she inadvertently stepped
off a sn1all rise in the pavement and exclaimed very
loudly indicating pain and thereafter spent two or three
days in bed Kith a very sore back. Even during the
trial her husband had to put hot packs on her back
in order to limber her up so she could get out of bed.
(T. 273).
Although l\J rs. Paul had previously cared for her
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children, done the fatnily shopping and done all of the
housework for her family, after the accident she was no
longer able to do any of that and at the time of the
trial she was still unable to do any of the heavy work.
She is still unable to care for her children and she still
has to have help with her housework and is· unable to
clean windows or do any of the heavier work at all. (T.
23-24, 368). Although prior to the accident they had
no help in the home, (T. 368), since then they have
had to have help constantly and Mr. Paul has had to
assist. He has t_aken care of them evenings and weekends while they have hired help for them in the daytime.
(T. 368). The same situation has occurred as to the
cooking: they have had hired help in t~e daytime and
Mr. Paul did it on weekends and at night. This situation
as to the cooking continued until March of 1952. (T.
369). As to the shopping, after the accident Mr. Paul
has had to do all of the shopping except a little recently.
(T. 369). Mrs. Paul is no longer able to drive an automobile at all. (T. 371). As a result, in the early part
of her illness when their oldest boy was required to go
frequently to the dentist for treatment, Mr. Paul had to
leave his business thirty miles away and take his oldest
boy to the dentist, which took up a half day's time once
a week for eight or nine weeks. (T. 372).
The accident obviously has entirely disrupted the
normal home life of the parties and as a result thereof
Mr. Paul has been deprived of his \\'ife 's very valuable
services for a long time and equally obviously will not
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receive the cmuplete service he did previously for some
time to come.
This stateinent, it is believed, summarizes fairly the
facts which were submitted to the jury and upon which
the jury based its verdict of $20,000. In this connection
it should be said that although there were undisputed
damages established by stipulation to an amount exceeding $3,500, the jury in its interrogatories assessed these
special damages at only $3,000.
STATE~1:ENT

OF POINTS

Point 1. The points relied on and argued by the Appellant,
To-wit: (1) That the general damages awarded to Irene Paul
are excessive, and (2) that the award of $5,000 to Charles J. Paul
for loss of services of his wife is excessive, are insufficient in
law to justify any relief to the Appellant, as no claim is made
that they have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.
Point 2. On this appeal the judgment of the Trial Court
is presumed correct, the burden of affirmatively showing error
is on Appellant, the evidence and the inferences therefrom must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the Respondents, and
the ruling on the motion for new trial was largely within the
trial court's sound discretion which will not lightly be disturbed.
Point 3. The damages awarded Irene Paul are not excessive
nor do they appear to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.
Point 4. The damages awarded Charles J. Paul for loss
of his wife's services are not excessive nor do they appear to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
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. Point 5.
point.

The decisions relied on by Appellant are not in

ARGUMENT
Point 1. The points relied on and argued by the Appellant,
to-wit; (1) That the general damages awarded to Irene Paul
are excessive and (2) that the award of $5,000 to Charles J.
Paul for loss of services of his wife is excessive, are insufficient
in law to justify any relief to the Appellant, as no claim is made
that they have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.

The Appellant argues only two points in his brief.
First, "that the general damages awarded to Irene
Paul are excessive," and second "that the award of
$5,000 to Charles J. Paul for loss of services of his
wife is excessive." See Appellant's brief, Pages 2 and
31. It is true that on page 2 of the brief under the heading Statement of Points, it is stated that the special
damages of $3,000 are excessive. However, the only
argument on this point is on Page 31 under the heading
of :f1lint 2 where it is said "with respect to the special
damages awarded, these also seem e~cessive. It is true
that Mrs. Paul received care in her home and while shi~
had a nurse, most of the care given to her was by her
own relatives or the relatives of Mr. Paul.'' The Appellant then lists some of the items of special damage but
eliminates entirely the doctors' fees, the hospital bills
and the medical bills, although there was ample evidence,
and he does not contend that there was not ample evi-
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dence, to support this. In fact substantially all of the
special da1nages were stipulated and they totaled more
than $3,500, of which the jury only awarded $3,000.
Obviously this point and the argument devoted t,)
it are insufficient to require the court to search the record to demonstrate an absence of evidence which he does
not even bother to assert, and it is apparent that this
point could not have been made in good faith for the
purpose of being relied upon. The case of
Keller vs. Wixom,
---------- Utah ·--------255 Pac. 2nd 118,
decided by this court on Mar.ch 31st of this year
to be in point here.

see~s

In any event Appellant dpes not, either in his statement of points or in his argument claim that the damages
aprpear ''to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.'' The granting of a new trial is,
of course, a procedural n1a tter. and must be governed
by Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appellant
does refer, in passing, to the fact that some of the
nursing services included were rendered by relatives of
Mr. and Mrs. Paul. The pecuniary obligation to pay
these relatives was supported by direct and positive
evidence. It is wholly immaterial that some of the
nursing care was rendered by relatives of the Respondents. It was so held by the California Court in
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Kimball vs. Northern Electric Company,
112 Pac. 153.

Rule 59(a) (5) deals with the granting of a new
trial upon the ground of excessive damages and say~
that the Trial Court may grant a new trial for ''excessive
or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.'' The Rule
does not authorize a new trial merely because the court
itself deems the damages excessive, but in addition to
the excessiveness of the damages it must be made to
appear that they "have been given under the influence
of passion or prepudice. '' Our Rule, as the Court
knows, is taken from our previous statute, Section 10440-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. It is firmly established
under this statute and the rule which is taken from it
that the granting of a new trial or the requiring of a
remission of part of the damages awarded by a jury
is proper only where the jury is clearly shown to han~
totally mistaken or disregarded rules of law for regulation of damages or wholly misconceived or disregarded
all evidence and thereby committed gross and palpable
error by rendering a verdict so enormous, outrageous or
unjust as to be attributable ot neither the court's instructions nor the evidence, but only to the jury's passion
or prejudice.
Moreover, it is equally well established that mere
excessiveness of the jury's verdict does not necessarily
~how that it was arrived at by passion or prejudice, ~~
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is required to authorize the Supreme Court to overrule
the Trial Court's discretion as to the granting of a
new trial or in the alternative the reinission of damageB,
and the mere fact that the jury awarded more damages
than another or the court n1ight have given or more than
the evidence justified, does not conclusively show that
the verdict was the result of the jury's passion o.r prejudice as is required to authorize the court to intervene
and take from the jury its constitutional function as
the trier of the facts in a law case such as this. It
is also established that the jury has great latitude in
assessing damages for personal injuries unless the excessiveness of the verdict can be determined as a
matter of law, which is not the case here. Before the
court can intervene in a matter of dmnages, the verdict
must be so excessive as to shock one's conscience and
clearly indicate passion, prejudice or caprice of the jury
as a matter of law. As above noted, mere excessiveness
of the verdict without more does not necessarily show
such passion or P,rejudice.
The above principles are firmly established in this
jurisdiction by the following decisions of this court:
Saltas vs. Affleck,
99 Utah 381,
105 Pac. 2nd 176;
Walkenhorst vs. Kesler,
92 Utah 312,
67 Pac. 2nd 654;
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Pauly vs. McCarthy,
109 utah 431,
184 Pac. 2nd 123
and
Duffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
---------- Utah ---------218 Pac. 2nd 1080.
This rule necessarily follows from the provisions of
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution of Utah,
which provides that in cases at law the appeal to this
court shall be on questions of law alone so that this court
cannot interfere unless the error of the jury is made to
appear as a matter of law. See
"Whittaker vs. Ferguson,
16 Utah 240,
51 Pac. 980.
In the case norw at bar the Appellant makes no contention that the verdict of the jury resulted from its
passion or prejudice and indeed there is nothing in the
record to indicate such passion or prejudice directed
against the Appellant. If there is anything in the
record in this regard, it would be the failure of the
jury to find the full amount of the special damages in
excess of $3,500 after it was stipulated that all of the
charges for medical, surgical, hospital and nursing
services had been incurred and that the charges were
reasonable, and this prejudice, if any, was directed
against the Respondents', not the Appellant's, case.
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Moreover, the Appellant here makes no claim whatsoever in his brief that the verdict is so excessive, as to
shock one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, pre
judice or caprice so that passion and prejudice could
be inferred a~ a nmtter of law, if indeed passion and
prejudice can ever be inferred as a matter of law. The
Appellant Inerely states plaintively that he now finds
the burden of his admitted fault to be excessive and requests the court to relieve him of it. This under the
Constitution, the Rules of Procedure and the decisions
of this court, the court cannot and should not do. Even
if all the assertions and claims made by Appellant in
his brief were taken as true (as they are not), still it
would not justify this cou.rt in ordering a new trial or
forcing the Respondents to remit any part of the damages. Appellant's contentions fail as a matter of law
and this alone should determine this case so that the
court would not be burdened with consideration of the
other points involved.
Point 2. On this appeal the judgment of the Trial Court
is presumed correct, the burden of affirmatively showing error
is on Appellant, the evidence and the inferences therefrom must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the Respondents, and
the ruling on the motion for- new trial was largely within the
trial court's sound disc1·etion which will not lightly be disturbed.

The decisions of this court have long since settled
beyond any peradventure of a doubt that there is a presumption that the judgment of the Trial Court was correct and that every reasonable intendment must be
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indulged in favor of it, and that the burden of affirmatively showing error is ~n the Appellant.
Palfreyman vs. Bates & Rogers
Construction Company,
108 Utah 142, 158 Pac. 2nd 132, 133
(Syllabus No.2) and cases there cited.
Moreover, on appeal fron1 a judgment on a verdict
in the plaintiffs' favor the plaintiffs are entitled to have
this court consider all of the evidence and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom in the
light most favorable to them.
Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pacific
Railroad Company,
----------Utah---------239 Pac. 2nd 163,
and
McLaughlin vs. Chief Consolidated
Mining Company,
62 Utah 532,
220 Pac. 726.
Moreover, the question of whether a new trial should
be granted on the ground of an excessive award of damages under the influence of passion or prejudice rests
largely within the Trial Court's sound discretion and
the Supreme Court is reluctant and slow to interfere
with the Trial Court's exercise of that discretion in
refusing a new trial on questions relating to damages.
See
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Caae No. 7957
IRENE PAUL, et al., Respondents vs. WOODROW
LAWRENCE KIRKENDALL, Appellant
ADDI'.riOH '1'0 RESPOHDEN'.rS 1 BRIEF FOR BENEFIT
OP RESPONDENTS IRENE PAUL AND CHARLES J. PAUL.

Pase

Immediately following the citations on
27 insert the following:
See also:
Geary vs • C&in
69 tJtah 340

255 Pac. 416,

commenting that the trial court is in a much
better position than the appellate court to
observe and determine Whether a jury was

actuated by passion or prejudice.

The recent and as yet unpublished decisions
ot this court in
Wheat vs. The Denver and

Rio Grande Weste:r,.n Railroad Co.

Mo. 783B

and.
Lodder vs. Western Pacific
Railroad Company, Mo. 7809,
further emphasize that the Judgment or the
trial court in cases auch as this should be
tollond.
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Mitchel vs. Arrowhead Freight Lines,
---------- ufah ---------214 Pac. 2nd 620;
Duffy vs. Union Pacific
Railroad Company, supra
and
Saltas vs. Mfleck, supra.
These well established principles should be equally
determinative of the question here and determinative in
Rspondents' favor. The Appellant in his brief nowhere
contends that the Tr-ial Court in this case abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial on the
ground of excessive damages. He merely reiterates that
the damages are excessive and it is submitted the assertion gains no force from the reiteration. As we will attempt hereafter to demonstrate, there is ample evidence
to justify the size of the verdict and to support the Trial
Court's exercise of his discretion. In fact, we are again
impressed with the fact that this is a strang~ case in
which the Appellant admits that he is at fault and that
the Respondents suffered damages and then, when the~
jury assesses the amount, he asks for a reversal of the
Trial Court's order affirming the verdict without even
cla·iming that the Trial Co-urt in so doing abused the discretion with 'll'hich he was vested. If any presumption
whatever is indulged in favor of the Trial Court's ruling,
it must in this case be affirn1ed.
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Point 3. The damages awarded Irene Paul are not excessive
nor do they appear to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.

After reviewing the facts in this case it would seem
that little argument need be devoted to the proposition
that the amount of the award of general damages to
Mrs. Paul was definitely not excessive either as a matter
of fact or of law, but that on the contrary, if anything,
it was inadequate. There is ample evidence in the record
from which the jury could, as it did, conclude that all
of the pain, inconvenience, suffering and disability which
Mrs. Paul suffered after the accident and up to and
beyond the date of the trial resulted from the accident
for which the Appellant acknowledged liability. In fact
the Appellant does not contend in this court that the
evidence did not support the verdict, but only that damages were excessive. Appellant's own expert, Dr. Jones,
concluded that she was totally disabled as a result of
the accident for nine weeks thereafter. (R. 393). Mrs.
Paul obviously suffered excruciating agony for two
1nonths after her accident and then although the severe
pain subsided somewhat and was somewhat quiescent
during July, her condition became increasingly worse
from August until the, time of her operation. After this
very necessary operation she again was totally disabled
for a period of months and again suffered excruciating
agony to the extent that she became terribly nervous.
She was totally disabled until I\Iarch of 1952 and is
still partially disabled and very apparently "ill be di~-
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abled for a long ti1ne into the future. She is still suffering pain and 1nisery as the result of the accident.
Everybody is agreed that she really suffered very severe
pain and that her condition was unendurable before the
operation. Everybody is agreed that the operation is
a dangerous one, characterized as ''major,'' and causing
great suffering.
Mrs. Paul certainly used due diligence and care in
obtaining and selecting doctors and she cooperated in
all of the treatment ·which was prescribed for her.
During the trial the Appellant seemed to be striving for
proof that the operation from which additional suffering
proceeded was not made necessary by the accident and
that Dr. Graham, vYho prescribed and performed it, had
made an error in judgment, but his own experts refuse
to back him up in that. !1oreover, whether the operation
was actually necessary or not is immaterial so long as
the Respondent exercised due care in the selection of her
doctors. It is not here contended that she did not use
such care. This is the law in the State of California,
which is controlling on this problem of substantive right.
See
Ash vs. Mortenson,
24 Cal. 2nd 654, 657 ;
150 Pac. 2nd 876.
We believe it to be equally the law in Utah.
Moreover, on this last point the court in its Instruetion No. 13 charged the jury that if Mrs. Paul has used
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reasonable diligence in securing the services of a competent medical doctor, giYen the doctor all clinical hi8tory of herself that is material and submits to his examination and follows the treatments prescribed, she cannot be charged with the negligence, poor judgment or
malpractice, if any, of her doctor. (T. 421). Inasmuch
as this statement of the law by the Trial Court to the
jury is not attacked in this court it has become the law
of the case and is binding upon the Appellant. The
jury's implied finding that Mrs. Paul did exercise due
care in selecting her doctors is amply supported by the
evidence.
The Courts of California have in many cases held
that under comparable circumstances similar awards are
not excessive. See
Thomas vs. Southern Pacific Co.,
116 C.A. 126; 2 Pac. 2nd 544;
Perry vs. McLauglin,
212 Cal. 1; 297 Pac. 554;
Sundberg vs. Ringel,
100 C.A. 545; 280 Pac. 557;
MeN own vs. Pacific Freight Lines,
50 C.A. 2nd 221; 122 Pac. 2nd 582;
Lovelandy vs. Sacramento City Lines,
102 C.A. 2nd 28; 226 Pac. 2nd 722;
Perry .vs. City of San Diego,
80 C.A. 2nd 166; 181 Pac. 2nd 98;
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Roedder vs. Lindsley,
28 Cal. 2nd 820; 822-823; 17:2 Pac. 2nd 353;
Brinck vs. Bradbury,
179 Cal. 376; 17'6 Pac. 690;
Lynch vs. Southern Pacific Co.,
24 C.A. 108; 140 Pac. 298;
Hamelin vs. Foulkes,
105 C.A. 458; 287 Pac. 526;
Pearson vs. "Whitworth,
75 C.A. 2n<;l 751; 171 Pac. 2nd 745;
Reilly vs. California Street Cable R .R. Co.,
76 C.A. 2nd 620; 173 Pac. 2nd 872;
W erkman vs. Howard Zink Corp.,
97 C.A. 2nd 418 ; 218 Pac. 2nd 43.
The jury who saw ~Irs. Paul through four long days
of trial and saw her obviously good faith efforts to conceal rather than exaggerate her disability as she moved
about the court room, and who personally observed her
demeanor and that of her husband in describing her
injuries and disabilities and the pain she suffered, are
certainly best qualified to measure the extent of her
past and probable future damages resulting from the
accident. Certainly this court frmn a cold record should
not try to say that $11,800 was so grossly and manifestly excessive as to shock the conscience and clearly
indicate passion and prejudice. In this case no one has
even contended that :Mrs. Paul's agony or disability
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were not real, and surely no one can in good conscience
say that, for this agony and this severe disability of her
back which destroys all certainty and stability and ease
of movement, the sum awarded her for past and future
pain, suffering, anxiety, mental anguish, inconvenience
and physical disability was at all excessive, especially in
view of the present inflated value of the dollar. Who
would say that this verdict even fairly compensated her
for her injuries and suffering~ If so, that one for some
additional sum should fairly be willing to undergo similar injuries, suffering and disability for: $12,000,000 for
that would mean a $200.00 profit on the transaction.
Manifestly no one whether a reasonable prudent man
or an unreasonable or imprudent man, would do that.
Actually this verdict, if the jury erred at all, was
too modest, for the evidence would have justified a
much larger verdict.
In this connection it may be properly noted that
under the law the present diminished purchasing power
of the dollar may be considered when estimating damages. See
Duffy vs. Union Pacific
Railroad Company, supra,
and
Pauly vs. McCarthy, supra.
Actually Mrs. Paul is only getting a verdict of approximately $7,000.00 in uninflated currency.
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The Trial Court n1anifestly did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order a new trial or a remission vf
damages in this case and the judgment must be affirmed.
Point 4,. The damages awarded Charles J. Paul for loss
of his wife's services are not excessive nor do they appear to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.

The court in accordance with the. California Law,
which we believe to be consistent with the Utah
Law, instructed the jury that if they found that Mr.
Paul was entitled to recover damages, they should award
to him ''a sum that will cmnpensate him reasonably for
any loss of his "Tife 's services which he has suffered, or
is reasonably certain to suffer in the future as a proximate result of the accident in question.'' The Court
further instructed the jury in effect that they should
fix the present pecuniary value of both past and future
services thus lost and to that end should consider the
character and condition of the home o-f the parties, the
services that have been performed by the wife in the
management of the household, the fact that there have
been children in the home and the character of the wife's
services, the extent to which any work connected with
the management of the home has been done by other
than the wife and the nature, extent and value of any
services of an advisory character although not involVing
any manual labor or physical skill which have been performed by the wife for the husband. The jury were
further instructed that the services rendered by a \vife
to her husband's benefit may be and often are of such
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character that no witness can say what they are worth.
Often they have no rnarket value equivalent and hence
it is not necessary that there be any direct or express
testimony as to the value of a wife's services to entitle
her husband to recover therefor. The court instructed the
jury that the relationship the wife sustains to her husband is a special and peculiar one and the actual facts
of the case at hand considered in the light of their own
experience and to the satisfaction of their own consciences must guide them in estimating the husband's
pecuniary loss. The Court properly added, under the
California Rule, that the law does not permit any award
simply for the loss of a wife's society or the comfort and
emotional values of her companionship. (Instruction No.
9, T. 417-418). These instruction were taken from the
California Book of Approved Jury Instructions and
clearly state the law in California. See
Edminister vs. Thorpe,
226 Pac. 2nd 353.

In that case the husband was awarded $4,000.00 for the
loss of services of his wife injured in an automobile ~wei
dent. The court there quoted with approval from n
California Jurisprudence, Section 83, Page 897 as follows:
''Consequential damages to the husband
include loss of services of the wife .... damages
for loss of services of the wife are recoverable,
though there is no direct proof of the vahw of
such services.''
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'Vho is there who would say that the substantially total
loss of the wife's services from the end of April in one
year until sometime in March of the following year,
with very strictly fu.nited services for some uncertain
time in the future, and possibly a p.ermanent loss of her
services, would not be \Yorth $5,000 ~ True it is, as the
Appellant points out, that some of the services, principally the caring for the children and the cooking of
the family Ineals during the daytime, was done by hired
help, the cost of which was partly and only partly compensated by the verdict for such damages, but are a wife's
services to the family at night of no value, especially
where there is a s1nall baby~ And are the wife's services as a shopper of no value~ And what of the services she had previously rendered to Mr. Paul which he
had himself to take care of at night and over weekends
as he testified 1 Moreover, as the Trial Court instructed
the jury, the wife's services are of a special nature, and
who is willing to say that hired help will adequately replace a loving, careful and intelligent mother in the
care and training of Respondents' children~
Those of us among the men in our society who have
had occasion to try to substitute for our. wives or mothers
in cases of an en1ergency will have a better idea than
Appellant of the true value of the services of a wife to
her husband in caring for the children, in managing and
running the home, and, in general, the managing and
organizing and performing all the multitudinous tasks
which a housewife and uwther must perform. As the
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Trial Court very properly instructed the jury, it is
very difficult to place a pecuniary value on such services.
The services a wife and mother render, like personal
injuries and suffering and anguish, cannot really be
valued in dollars in view of their special nature.
It is submitted that no fair and reasonable man can
conscientiously say that an award of $5,000 to Mr. Paul
for the loss of his wife's peculiar and personal services
in the management of his home and family is at all
excessive, not to mention its being so excessive as to
shock the conscience or disclose passion and prejudice
as a matter of law. It seems eminently fair and just
and the Trial Court did not abuse his discretion in refusing to order a new trial because of this award.
Point 5.
point.

The decisions relied on by Appellant are not in

Perhaps some brief analysis of the decisions relied
on by Appellant will be helpful to the Court.
It must first be observed that none of the authorities
cited hy the Appellant come from either California or
Utah and hence are not in any sense binding upon the
Court.
Moreover, all are distinguishable so that they are
not even persuasive. The cases fall into several groups
which we shall try to consider in turn.
First, several of the dP<'i:-;ion:-; are either memoran-
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dum decisions or very brief opinions which contain no
discussion whatsoever of the nature or extent of the
injuries or lost services involved. As a result they
cannot help us either way. These cases include
Crawford vs. City of New York,
59 N.Y.S. 2nd 873,
and
Leverich vs. Casden,
300 N.Y.S. 762.
Second, we have two cases where the Appellate
Courts refused to disturb the Trial Court's exercise of
its discretion in fixing the danmges and hence are
obviously of no help to the Appellant here. The first of
these is the case of
Ravare vs. :McCormick and Company,
166 Southern 183, (Louisiana, 1936).
There the Louisiana Court refused to disturb the judgment of the Trial Court, the trier of the fact, in assessing damages in the first instance. In that case the
damages were so 1nodest that when considered in the
light of the jurisdiction it seems quite probable that the
plain tiff was a Negro.
The second case in this classification is
Colonial Baking Con1pany vs. Acquino,
103 S. W. 2nd 613 (Tennessee, 1936).
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There were three plaintiffs there involved and in each
of the three cases the Trial Court in the exercise of its
discretion had suggested the re1nission of a part of the
verdict as an alternative of the granting of a motion
for new trial, and the Appellate Court refused to disturb the exercise of the Trial Court's discretion. In
this case the amounts of damages allowed by the Trial
Court and affirmed by the Appellate Court are interesting. The Trial Court allowed the first plaintiff, a woman,
$15,000.00 for severe injuries to her head and chest,
requiring months of painful treatment, the loss of all
teeth and permanent disfigurement, and which rendered
her neurotic and nervous.
The second plaintiff, an eleven year old boy, suffered a fractured leg and maimed hand which was rendered practically useless: In the course of treatment the
leg became infected and thereafter treatment involved
keeping the leg in traction for a month, both of which
caused great suffering. The Trial Court suggested a
reduction of $5,000.00 in a $15,000.00 verdict and the
Appellate Court refused to disturb this exercise of
discretion. The third plaintiff was the husband of the
first and the jury awarded hiln a verdict of $10,000.00
for loss of service of his wife and for n1edical damage.
The proved medical damage amounted to $3,046, in<'luding an estimate of $500.00 for future medical treatmenl
The Court noted that the wife had resumed her work
in her husband's shop and noted that during her irwapaeity a substitute had been hired to work in the shop for

38
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$540.00 and further observed that under these circumstances future loss of service was highly speculative.
It approved the Trial Court's suggested reduction to a
total of $5,000 for medical expense and loss of service.
The Appellate Court in this case held that the Trial
Court had properly exercised its discretion but that there
was no error in refusing further to reduce these verdicts.
It is to be noticed that this case was decided in 1936 in
the depths of the depression and that the amounts
approved were then the equivalent of double the amount
in our present inflated currency so that the damages
approved by the court for injuries to the wife, which
were apparently less serious than the injuries in the ·
case at Bar, were better than 2¥2 times the amount of
the verdict here for Irene Paul's general damages.
Thirdly, in all of the above cases except the Colonial
Baking Company case last considered, and in the additional cases mentioned in this sub-section of our brief,
it must be noted that the Appellate Courts considered
the question of damages without any reference whatsoever to the problern of passion or prejudice of the jury
and it is apparent fron1 the decisions that under the
rules or statutes there being administered, the court was
not required to find passion or prejudice of the jury
before the court was entitled to intervene. This is, of
course, not the case in Utah. In addition to the cases
above considered, as aforesaid, the cases of
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Missouri Pacific Transportation Con1pany
vs. Socker,
138 S. W. 2nd 371 (Arkansas, 1940),
and
Ca:rlballal vs. Pilgrin1 Laundry, Inc.
5 N.Y.S. 2nd 38, 18 N.E. 2nd 44 (1938).
and
Duncan vs. Branson,
110 Pac. 2nd 789 (Kansas, 1941),
fall in this classification. They are clearly distinguishable on this ground from the case at Bar and are of no
help to the Appellant.
In the Carballal case it is also interesting to note
that during the depression the court left the verdict at
$15,000.00 for personal injuries to 3: 5lj2 year old child
and at $;3,000.00 for her Father's loss of her services.
T.hese verdicts are obviously the equivalent of $25,000
to $30,000 and $5,000 to $6,000 in the present inflated
currency.
In the case of
O'Brian vs. J. I. Case Cmnpany,
2 N. W. 2nd"107 (Nebraska, Jan. 1942),
the jury awarded $10,000 for a contusion or bruise of
the periostium of the right middle eolldyl<>, a bone in the
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right elbow, which caused considerable pain, and a 372
inch cut just below the hairline of the right brow which
resulted in a pennanent scar. Undisputed n1edical testimony was that the elbow would becon1e normal and some
other scars which had been sustained would diminish
with lapse of time. The plaintiff had received n1oderate
shock and anen1ia and she complained of headache, elbow
pain and irritability, but she lost no wages and was
not disabled frmn and could still perform the duties of
her employment. For these relatively slight injuries
the court held that $10,000 was excessive and manifestly
resulted fro1n passion and prejudice so that a new trial
should have been granted. The tremendous difference
in 'the severity and duration of the injuries between that
case and the case at Bar makes the1n readily distinguishable on the facts.
Finally it should be observed that all of the cases
cited by Appellant were decided before the presently
existing inflation occurred and if the verdicts which
were approved by the court were to be translated into
inflated dollars of present value, most of them would
tend to support the Respondents' position here. None
of the cases ·are authority for the position advocated by
the Appellant in the case at Bar.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is very respectfully submitted first,
that the Appellant's brief fails to state any grounds
upon which this court can grant him any relief and sec-
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ondly, that when the various presumptions to which the
verdict and the trial court's order refused a new trial
are entitled and considered, the verdicts complained of
are not at all excessive, but on the contrary are very
modest, and that the judgn1ent must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL THATCHER of
YOUNG, THATCHER & GL~-\SS;\L\J\
Attorneys-at-law
1018 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
MILO V. OLSON, Esquire,
of the California Bar
Attorneys for Respondents.
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